PENGARUH FAMILY OWNERSHIP, FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL CONNECTION TERHADAP AGENCY COST OF DEBT

Authors

Riza Febrian Universitas Andalas
Elvira Luthan Universitas Andalas

DOI:

Keywords:

Family Ownership, Financial Performance, Agency Cost of Debt, Political Connection.

Abstract

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh family ownership, financial performance, dan political connection terhadap agency cost of debt. Data dikumpulkan dari 395 observasi perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama periode 2020–2024. Metode yang digunakan adalah regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa family ownership berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap agency cost of debt, sementara financial performance berpengaruh positif signifikan, dan Political connection berpengaruh positif tidak signifikan terhadap agency cost of debt. Penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi teoretis dalam memahami peran struktur kepemilikan, kinerja keuangan, dan hubungan politik dalam tata kelola perusahaan di Indonesia.

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